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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of “racial neutrality” remains omnipresent in our 
political and judicial discourse about the use of race in college and 
university admissions.  Proponents of “race neutrality” have advocated 
for the use of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action as a possible 
alternative to the explicit use of race in college and university 
                                                                                                             
 *  B.A., University of Kentucky, 2005; J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College 
of Law, 2009. The author is a senior associate in the business litigation and appellate 
practice groups at the law firm of Frost Brown Todd LLC in Louisville, Kentucky. He 
served as counsel to a group of law professors from the University of Louisville Brandeis 
School of Law that filed an amicus brief in support of the Respondents in the 2015 sequel 
to Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. The views expressed in this Essay should not 
be attributed to Frost Brown Todd and belong to the author alone. 
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admissions.1  Indeed, even Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have 
argued that the use of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action is an 
acceptable, constitutional race-neutral alternative to race-based 
affirmative action.2  And in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the 
Supreme Court seemingly endorsed race-neutral class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action by imposing on colleges and 
universities “the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to 
racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do 
not suffice.”3 
Not surprisingly, the briefs and oral argument in the sequel to Fisher 
I suggest that class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action could be a 
“workable race-neutral alternative” to the University of Texas’ use of 
race in its admission criteria.4  But I’m not convinced that’s possible.  I 
instead see class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action as a rhetorical 
device to make the abolishment of race-based affirmative action more 
palatable to the Court. Recent public opinion polls show that a majority 
of Americans—including a vast majority of racial and ethnic 
minorities—continue to support the limited use of race in college and 
university admissions.5  In my view, proponents of class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action—who, incidentally tend to be 
opponents of race-based affirmative action—seek to soften the blow if 
the Court offs race-based affirmative action by providing the possibility 
of a race-neutral alternative. 
                                                                                                             
1 See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037, 
1060 (1996). 
2 Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must 
First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 156 (1979) (“I do not, on the 
other hand, oppose—indeed, I strongly favor—what might be called . . . ‘affirmative 
action programs’ of many of types of help for the poor and disadvantaged.”); see also 
Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough 
Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 410-11 (1987) (“Any preferences given should be 
directly related to the burdens that have been unfairly placed in those individuals’ paths, 
rather than on the basis of race and gender, or on other characteristics that are often poor 
proxies for true disadvantage.”). 
3 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (“Fisher I”). 
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-34, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, --- 
U.S. --- (No. 14-981); see also Brief for Richard D. Kahlenberg Supporting Petitioner 
Brief of Richard D. Kahlenberg as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 13-15, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, --- U.S. --- (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 5345843 (U.S.). 
5 Bruce Drake, Public strongly backs affirmative action programs on campus, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/22/
public-strongly-backs-affirmative-action-programs-on-campus/; see also Frances Kai-
Hwa Wang, New Study Shows Asian American Support for Affirmative Action, NBC 
NEWS, (Oct. 6, 2014, 5:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/new-study
-shows-asian-american-support-affirmative-action-n213976. 
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But substituting class and socioeconomic factors in the place of race 
in college and university admissions simply asks institutions to hide the 
ball, and use class and socioeconomic factors as proxies for race.  In fact, 
one civil rights organization has already challenged a California school 
district’s student assignment plan on the basis that it used class and 
socioeconomic factors as unconstitutional proxies for race.6  While that 
challenge failed as a matter of state law, the “proxy for race” argument 
would seemingly doom any class-based, socioeconomic alternative to 
race-based affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause. 
This Essay seeks to provide some clarity about the push for class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action.  Although facially neutral, 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action suffers from many of the 
same constitutional problems as race-based affirmative action.  Just like 
its race-based counterpart, class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action 
is tainted by the race-conscious motive of increasing the number of racial 
and ethnic minorities on college campuses.  That alone should make 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action unconstitutional under the 
Court’s existing non-affirmative action equal protection jurisprudence. 
Yet the Court’s affirmative action decisions, Bakke and Grutter—the 
very decisions that proponents of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action want overruled—provide colleges and universities a limited 
exception to experiment with race-neutral and race-conscious affirmative 
action measures.  Those decisions are vital to the constitutionality of 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action, and without them, class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action is vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge under a number of theories.  But even if a new constitutional 
framework is developed in the absence of Bakke and Grutter, class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action is so laden with the same 
alleged practical problems as race-based affirmative action that perhaps 
we are better off with the express use of race instead. 
II. FACIAL NEUTRALITY AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RACE-
CONSCIOUSNESS OF CLASS-BASED, SOCIOECONOMIC AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 
In Washington v. Davis, the Court concluded that “the invidious 
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be 
traced to a racially discriminatory motive.”7  Less than a year later, in 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
                                                                                                             
6 See Am. Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 
798-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
7 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
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Corporation, the Court simplified the holding in Davis into a general 
rule: “Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”8  Thus, under Davis 
and Arlington Heights, discriminatory motive by the government is the 
constitutional touchstone for the Court’s equal protection analysis.  
Indeed, even when a statute is facially neutral in regards to race, the 
Court has consistently concluded that it will be deemed unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause.9  Davis and Arlington Heights 
therefore have profound implications for the constitutionality of class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action. 
Because “any official action that treats a person differently on 
account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect,” all racial 
classifications, whether designated “benign” or “remedial,” are subject to 
strict scrutiny.10  If all strict scrutiny did was set an exceedingly high 
burden for the government’s use of racial classifications, then class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action could be a constitutionally 
“workable” alternative to race-based affirmative action. But strict 
scrutiny purports to do more; it is designed to provide a “most searching 
examination” of the government’s use of racial classifications to “‘smoke 
out’ illegitimate uses of race.”11  This “smok[ing] out” feature of strict 
scrutiny is consistent with the language of Davis and Arlington Heights 
regarding facially neutral laws.12  Strict scrutiny requires the Court to go 
beyond the text of a facially neutral policy and inquire into the 
government’s asserted interest for its adoption.13  If that’s true, then 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action should also be subject to 
strict scrutiny. 
The fundamental problem with class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action is that while it eliminates the need to use racial 
classifications, it does not address the discriminatory motives that 
                                                                                                             
8 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
9 See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; see also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 272 (1979). 
10 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); see also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
11 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223, 226 (1995) (quoting 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). 
12 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (noting that under Davis and Arlington Heights that 
“even if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a 
discriminatory purpose”). 
13 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (citation omitted); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 
541, 546 (1999) (“The task of assessing a jurisdiction’s motivation . . . is not a simple 
matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently complex endeavor, one requiring the trial court 
to perform a ‘sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available.’”). 
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supposedly underlie race-based affirmative action programs generally.  
Proponents of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action suggest that 
such programs are analytically distinct from race-based affirmative 
action because class and socioeconomic status are not suspect categories, 
unlike race.14  But that addresses the issue of classification, not motive.  
If Davis and Arlington Heights are correct, then the relevant 
constitutional inquiry for class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action 
should not focus on whether classifications are used, but on the 
government’s motives for adopting class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action as a purported race-neutral alternative. 
And that is where class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action runs 
into trouble.  Discriminatory intent “exists whenever the government 
selects a course of action at least in part ‘because of’ its adverse—or 
beneficial—effects upon a racial group.”15  Proponents of class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action recognize that the primary purpose of 
such programs is to increase the number of racial and ethnic minorities 
on college campuses.16  Thus, while class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action programs are facially neutral and avoid the use of 
“highly suspect” racial classifications, the purpose behind them is 
undoubtedly race-conscious.  In a class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action admissions program, class and socioeconomic status 
are used as proxies for race.  That should subject class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny under Davis 
and Arlington Heights. 
Thus, the race-conscious motive underlying class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action should cast substantial doubt on its 
constitutionality.  Indeed, as one commentator has observed, “[i]f facially 
neutral affirmative action schemes are subject to an equal protection 
challenge on the grounds of discriminatory intent, it follows that a 
                                                                                                             
14 Kahlenberg, supra note 1, at 1064 (“[C]lass-based preferences provide a 
constitutional way to achieve greater racial and ethnic diversity, because they do not use 
a suspect category for decision making.”); see also Genevieve Campbell, Note, Is 
Classism the New Racism? Avoiding Strict Scrutiny’s Fatal in Fact Consequences by 
Diversifying Student Bodies on the Basis of Socioeconomic Status, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 
679, 695-96 (2007) (“Economic affirmative action is defined as a race neutral alternative 
to diversifying student bodies on the basis of race.”). 
15 Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative 
Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2348 (2000). 
16 Kahlenberg, supra note 1, at 1097 (“For the most part, however, class-based 
preferences are designed to supplant, rather than supplement, race-based preferences.”) 
(emphasis in original); see also Scalia, supra note 2, at 156 (“It may well be the many, or 
even most, of those benefited by [affirmative action] programs would be members of 
minority races that the existing programs exclusively favor. I would not care if all of 
them were. The unacceptable vice is simply selecting or rejecting them on the basis of 
their race.”) (emphasis in original). 
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government instituting a class-based preference may have to demonstrate 
that the preference is not racially motivated.”17  The only saving grace 
for class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action may be the case that 
many of its proponents abhor: Grutter v. Bollinger.18 
III. THE DEMISE OF GRUTTER AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
EXCEPTION 
A. The Constitutionality of Class-based, Socioeconomic 
Affirmative Action Without Grutter 
Because the Court in Grutter recognized that colleges and 
universities have a “compelling interest in attaining a diverse student 
body,” it operates as an exception to Davis and Arlington Heights for 
colleges and universities to consider class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action.19  While the government’s use of racial classifications 
and policies with discriminatory motives are presumptively 
unconstitutional, Grutter permits colleges and universities to experiment 
with race-specific means and race-neutral alternatives to achieve a 
diverse student body in order to obtain certain educational benefits.20  
Indeed, Grutter can be read as requiring the use of race-neutral 
alternatives before a college or university can turn to the express use of 
race in admissions.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Fisher I certainly 
suggests as much.21 
Although Grutter appears to allow the use of class and 
socioeconomic factors to serve as proxies for race in college and 
university admissions, many proponents of class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action believe that the case was wrongly decided.  Justice 
Thomas, for example, has described Grutter as “a radical departure from 
our strict-scrutiny precedents,” and has explicitly stated that it should be 
                                                                                                             
17 Chapin Cimino, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After 
Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge? 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289, 1301 
(1997). 
18 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also id. at 356 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
19 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309. 
20 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40; 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
21 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that 
no workable race-neutral alternative would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity.”). 
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overruled.22  And commentators that support class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action have described Grutter  as “flawed” and a “mistake.”23 
I don’t see why that is.  Without Grutter, diversity is no longer a 
compelling government interest, and without diversity as a compelling 
government interest, there is no need to employ either race-specific or 
race-neutral means to achieve that interest.24  Class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action is totally dependent on Grutter’s 
recognition that diversity is a compelling government interest.25  In fact, 
some proponents of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action 
concede this point.26  If proponents of class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action truly believe that race-specific admissions programs 
are unconstitutional, then they should focus on the question of whether 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action can lead to equal or 
greater racial and ethnic diversity on college campuses. 
Yet Grutter is clearly in the crosshairs of proponents of class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action.  For example, the Project on Fair 
Representation, the non-profit advocacy group behind the Fisher 
litigation, has already filed cases against Harvard and the University of 
North Carolina with the express intent of having the Court overrule 
Grutter and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.27  And if 
those challenges to Grutter and Bakke are successful, where does that 
leave the constitutionality of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action?  The answer is that without Grutter, class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action is susceptible to constitutional challenges on two 
grounds. 
                                                                                                             
22 Id. at 2422. 
23 L. Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create 
Educational Diversity While Attacking Socio-Economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 297, 309 (2005); Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, 
Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
Overturn its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. L. & POL. 437, 486 (2011). 
24 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race After the 
Ban on Racial Preferences? 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 277, 291 (2007) (noting that Texas 
had no compelling interest to enact its race-neutral Top Ten Percent Plan before Grutter). 
25 Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 291 (“[G]iven that [colleges and universities] have a 
compelling interest in pursuing racial diversity directly, surely they also have a 
compelling interest in pursuing it indirectly.”). 
26 See Weeden, supra note 23, at 321 (“It is conceded under Grutter’s diversity 
rationale a public law school may look at race-neutral [socioeconomic status] factors for 
both African-Americans and whites as a positive plus factor in the admission process.”). 
27 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Lyle 
Denniston, Direct new challenges to Bakke ruling (FURTHER UPDATE), SCOTUSblog, 
Nov. 17, 2014, http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/direct-new-challenges-to-bakke-
ruling/. 
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First, as noted above, class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action 
and race-based affirmative action share a race-conscious motive.  Class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action, though facially neutral, seeks to 
provide a benefit to racial and ethnic minorities by using class and 
socioeconomic status as proxies for race and ethnicity to increase the 
number of those students on campus.28  But the Court has made clear that 
whether a facially neutral law adversely affects or benefits racial and 
ethnic minorities is immaterial.29  And although some white students may 
benefit under a class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action admissions 
program, Davis and Arlington Heights make the results of a facially 
neutral policy virtually irrelevant in the constitutional analysis.30  The 
race-conscious purpose behind such a program alone is sufficient to 
deem it unconstitutional.31 
Similarly, Chapin Cimino has described the Court’s ban on facially 
neutral race-conscious laws as a principle against “subterfuge.”32  
Relying upon the Court’s legislative redistricting cases, Cimino argues 
that when race-neutral measures such as class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action “appear[ ] to be motivated by a desire to benefit racial 
minorities, it is open to a subterfuge challenge.”33 Thus, the Court’s 
prohibition against subterfuge precludes the government from using race 
in “covert” or indirect ways to conceal a race-conscious motive.34  Even 
if a college or university moves to class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action if Bakke and Grutter are overruled, the Court “could 
infer subterfuge” by conducting a “comparative empirical analysis of the 
beneficiaries of the former race-based preference and the beneficiaries of 
the replacement, class-based preference[.]”35  The Court could also 
consider “a pattern of changes in qualifying criteria yielding a constant 
increase in minority beneficiaries,” and on a more basic level, statements 
by the college or university “stating the intended goals of the class-based 
preferences.”36 
                                                                                                             
28 See supra note 16. 
29 See supra note 15; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642-43. 
30 Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (noting that disproportionate impact “[s]tanding alone . . .  
does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be subjected too the strictest 
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations”); see also Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
31 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995). 
32 Cimino, supra note 17, at 1301. 
33 Id. at 1294. 
34 Id. at 1298. 
35 Id. at 1304; cf. Derek W. Black, Fisher v. Texas and the Irrelevance of Function in 
Race Cases, 57 HOW. L. J. 477, 489 (2014) (“[D]emographics can serve as proxy in 
almost every metropolitan area in the country . . . .”). 
36 Cimino, supra note 17, at 1304. 
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Second, if Grutter and Bakke are overruled, it’s not like a college or 
university can immediately enact a class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action program.  The Court could also infer “subterfuge” by 
looking at the temporal proximity between the overruling of Grutter and 
Bakke and the adoption of a class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action program by a college or university. 
The Court’s decision in Lane v. Wilson, a voting rights case cited 
approvingly in Arlington Heights, is illustrative of how temporal 
proximity can deem a class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action 
program unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.37  In Lane, 
the Court declared an Oklahoma statute passed in reaction to a previous 
decision by the Court unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.38  
In Guinn v. United States, the Court declared Oklahoma’s provision 
providing “grandfather clause” immunity from state voting registration 
requirements, which essentially prohibited African-Americans from 
voting, unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.39  The 
Oklahoma legislature replaced the “grandfather clause” immunity 
provision with a statutory scheme that required registration as a 
prerequisite to voting.40  The scheme required all individuals—mostly 
African-Americans—who had not voted in the previous election to 
register within a span of twelve days.41  Failure to register within that 
span constituted a permanent forfeiture of the right to vote.42  The Court 
concluded that this scheme “was obviously directed toward the 
consequences of the decision in Guinn v. United States.”43 
Because the scheme was primarily directed at African-Americans 
and enacted as a means to circumvent the Court’s holding in Guinn, the 
Court held the scheme unconstitutional.44  In so finding, the Court looked 
to the historical background of the Oklahoma statutory scheme as 
evidence of its discriminatory purpose.45  The practical and 
unconstitutional effect of the scheme, then, was “to accord to the 
members of the [African-American] race who had been discriminated 
against in the outlawed registration system of 1914, not more than 12 
days within which to reassert constitutional rights which this Court found 
in the Guinn case to have been improperly taken from them.”46 
                                                                                                             
37 429 U.S. at 267 (citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)). 
38 Lane, 307 U.S. at 269-70 (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)). 
39 Id. at 269-71. 
40 Id. at 270. 
41 Id. at 271. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 277. 
45 Id. at 275. 
46 Id. at 276. 
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The Court’s decision in Lane, in addition to Arlington Heights, 
prevent a college or university from immediately considering class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action if Bakke and Grutter are 
overruled.  Imagine that Bakke and Grutter are overruled, and a week 
later, a college or university adopts a class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action admissions program. Under Lane, the temporal 
proximity between the Court’s hypothetical opinion overruling Bakke 
and Grutter and the decision to adopt a facially neutral class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action admissions program could be evidence 
that the program is also unconstitutionally tainted by a race-conscious 
motive.47  In Lane, the fact that the Oklahoma legislature enacted its 
facially neutral statute a mere 12 days after the Court’s decision in Guinn 
was dispositive in the Court’s analysis.  A class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action program adopted by a college or university right after 
the overruling of Bakke and Grutter would most likely reach the same 
fate as the statutory scheme in Lane. 
B. After the Demise of Grutter: A New Approach With Old 
Problems 
The overruling of Bakke and Grutter may require a substantial 
rewrite of the Court’s precedent to accommodate class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action.  One commentator, Frederick A. 
Morton, Jr., has suggested that class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action would “have more appeal and would be less suspect as a 
diversionary tactic if the socioeconomically disadvantaged received an 
adequate level of protection under the Constitution.”48  Morton argues 
that being poor and socioeconomically disadvantaged should be treated 
as a protected class.49  But he also acknowledges that the Court has been 
generally hostile to claims that would treat education, the receipt of 
welfare benefits, and housing—basic necessities for the indigent—as 
fundamental rights under the Constitution.50 
Treating class and socioeconomic status as a protected class creates 
sensitive line-drawing problems.  Because class and socioeconomic 
status can change over time, they do not bear any similarities to 
immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, sex, or national origin.  
                                                                                                             
47 See id.; see also North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 44-45 
(1971) (declaring state statute banning busing and race-conscious remedies enacted 
during school desegregation litigation unconstitutional). 
48 Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration 
of America Denying the Impact of Race, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1120 (1993). 
49 See id. at 1120 (“A more direct way to assist the poor would first be to acknowledge 
their special status.”). 
50 Id. at 1119. 
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Affirmative action was originally conceived as a program that sought to 
remedy discrimination based upon immutable characteristics, not 
indigence.51  Further, the Court would be charged with answering the 
question of how poor must one be in order to be a member of the 
protected class.  What is the monetary threshold?  Does the threshold 
index for inflation?  These kinds of problems are legislative in nature, 
and not the kind the Court should consider in deciding the 
constitutionality of a class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action 
program. 
One promising potential post-Grutter analytical framework that may 
support the constitutionality of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action comes from the Court’s legislative redistricting cases.  In his 
concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, Justice Kennedy listed a number of race-neutral 
measures school districts could use to combat resegregation.52  In doing 
so, Justice Kennedy cited to the Court’s plurality opinion in Bush v. 
Vera, in which it observed that “‘[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely 
because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race.’”53  Some 
commentators have argued that Justice Kennedy’s inclusion of this 
language suggests that facially neutral class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action programs may be constitutionally permissible, even 
when adopted with a race-conscious motive.54  Justice Kennedy does 
urge elected officials in his concurrence to be candid in their diversity-
oriented motivations if they employ race-neutral means.55  And 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. at 1123 (“There is nothing in the history of affirmative action . . . that would 
suggest that race was used as a proxy or that class was originally the basis for such 
programs.”); see also id. at 1125 (“The brief legislative history of affirmative action, 
coupled with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law, suggests that there is simply 
no basis for arguing that affirmative action was designed to combat indigence.”). 
52 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
53 Id. at 789 (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)); see also id. (discussing 
race-neutral mechanisms that could be used by school districts to prevent resegregation 
and noting that “[t]hese mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different 
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by 
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible”). 
54 George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, Serious Consideration of Race-Neutral 
Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 1012-13 (2008). Before 
Justice Kennedy, Professor Goodwin Liu had previously drawn a similar legal analogy 
between legislative redistricting and secondary school student assignment plans. See 
Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 301-02 (2007). 
55 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (“Executive and legislative branches, which 
for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be 
permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation 
does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might 
have on students of different races.”). 
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borrowing the standard from Vera and other redistricting cases, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved could mean that strict 
scrutiny should not apply to class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action unless race was the predominant factor for its adoption.56 
But even if Justice Kennedy’s dicta was entitled to some weight, he 
not only “fail[ed] to grapple with any of the many cases strictly 
scrutinizing race proxies—many of which he authored or joined—but the 
only case he cited for his dicta—Bush v. Vera—is a voting district case 
in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to a race proxy (a race proxy 
designed to help African Americans, no less).”57  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Parents Involved could mean that “if the Court adopts the 
‘predominant’ motivation standard from the voting district cases as 
opposed to the more traditional ‘but-for’ motivation standard it used in 
other race-proxy cases, then it will be harder for plaintiffs to make the 
necessary showing to invoke strict scrutiny.”58  By contrast, by invoking 
Vera, it could also mean that strict scrutiny will always be the standard, 
but that a class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action program will 
generally survive if racial and ethnic diversity is one of several reasons 
for the program’s implementation. 
Indeed, one could put forth several motivations for adopting a class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action program. Those motivations 
could include class and socioeconomic diversity; geographical diversity; 
diversity of political affiliation; and remedying all types of 
discrimination and prejudices based upon sex, gender, sexual orientation, 
religion, national origin, and race and ethnicity.59  The statistical 
evidence is fairly overwhelming in demonstrating that a more diverse 
campus leads to greater educational outcomes.60  And government 
agencies, the military, and corporations see diversity on college 
campuses “as a requirement for better goods, products, and services . . .  
[and] a boon to their self-interest as well as to the society as a whole.”61  
These considerations could all play a role in the decision to adopt a class-
                                                                                                             
56 La Noue & Marcus, supra note 54, at 1013; see also Liu, supra note 54, at 307. 
57 Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 290. 
58 Id. 
59 See Forde-Mazuri, supra note 15, at 2365-71 (arguing that race-neutral means can 
be used to combat societal discrimination); see also id. at 2383-84 (arguing that 
remedying societal racial discrimination is not constitutionally suspect). Professor Forde-
Mazuri is careful to explain that the Court has not ruled that societal discrimination 
cannot be a compelling government interest, but that it cannot be a compelling 
government interest when the government uses race-based classifications. See id. at 2365. 
60 See generally Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: 
Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2002). 
61 Randall Kennedy, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATION ACTION, AND THE LAW 
97 (2013). 
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based, socioeconomic affirmative action program by a college or 
university if Bakke and Grutter are dismantled.  And they will be critical 
in the Court’s constitutional evaluation under a predominant motivation 
standard. 
Setting aside the question of what is the proper legal framework for 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action programs, the remaining 
question is whether those programs resolve the practical concerns raised 
by the use of race-conscious affirmative action.  Critics of race-conscious 
affirmative action argue that a class-based, socioeconomic alternative is 
better because it is “less likely to exacerbate those race-related social 
problems identified by the Court, such as the perpetuation of stereotypes, 
inflaming racial hostility and, in general, delaying the day that race no 
longer has significance in American life.”62  Justice Thomas has been 
particularly critical of race-based affirmative action.  He contends that 
race-based affirmative action is steeped in what he deems “racial 
paternalism” and results in “unintended consequences” by “stamp[ing] 
minorities with a badge of inferiority” and “taint[ing] the 
accomplishments of all those who are admitted as a result of racial 
discrimination.”63 
But some of these criticisms are overblown and suffer from serious 
inconsistencies; others lack real empirical support.  Take, for instance, 
Justice Thomas’ criticism that race-based affirmative action is steeped in 
“racial paternalism” and results in stigma.  First, these arguments 
shouldn’t even be a part of the equal protection analysis.  Policies 
intended to help racial and ethnic minorities cannot be declared 
unconstitutional because they have “unintended consequences” or 
inadvertently cause harm.64  Policies such as race-based affirmative 
action intended to help racial and ethnic minorities obtain undergraduate 
and professional degrees that have “unintended consequences” differ 
from laws enacted during the Jim Crow era and segregation because 
stigmatization and the relegation of African-Americans to second-class 
citizenship was the intended purpose of those laws.65  Justice Thomas’ 
concern about “racial paternalism” and stigma is nothing but an effects-
based analysis that was soundly rejected in Davis and Arlington Heights. 
                                                                                                             
62 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 15, at 2371. 
63 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240, 241; Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432. 
64 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65. 
65 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Every 
one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . . to exclude colored 
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”); see also Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, at 494 (1954) (“To separate them from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
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Second, arguments about racial paternalism and stigma are, in 
reality, a new form of judicial paternalism that presupposes racial and 
ethnic minorities are incapable of using the political process to support 
policies they believe are in their best interests.  Race-based affirmative 
action currently has broad support from racial and ethnic minorities.66   
Recent public opinion polls show that the majority of Americans, 
including 84% of African-Americans, 80% of Latinos, and 69% of 
Asian-Americans support affirmative action policies.67  If racial and 
ethnic minorities believe that affirmative action policies are harmful to 
them, then they are free to opt out by using the referendum process 
available in many states to place affirmative action bans on the ballot.68  
It is rather ironic—and seemingly undemocratic—that unelected judges 
and unaccountable academics have made the broad assumption that 
racial and ethnic minorities have feelings of inferiority due to race-based 
affirmative action, and that class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action would be better for them. 
Proponents of class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action also fail 
to recognize that empirical evidence shows that racial and ethnic 
minorities do not suffer from internal stigma and self-doubt because of 
race-based affirmative action policies.  In a survey concerning the use of 
affirmative action in law schools, researchers found that racial and ethnic 
minorities experience low levels of internal stigma and self-doubt, and 
encounter very little external stigma from their classmates concerning 
their capabilities.69  Proponents of class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action often say that racial and ethnic minorities feel 
stigmatized and demeaned by race-based affirmative action, but rely 
upon anecdotal evidence and personal accounts, not independently 
verifiable quantitative data.70 
Additionally, class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action may be 
no less stigmatizing than race-based affirmative action.71  At most, all 
class-based, socioeconomic affirmative action purports to do is shift 
stigma from race to class and socioeconomic status.  That doesn’t end the 
                                                                                                             
66 See supra note 5. 
67 See id. 
68 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 
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harmful effects that purportedly arise from being stigmatized.  Class-
based, socioeconomic affirmative action doesn’t even resolve whatever 
harms there are to “innocent victims” of race-based affirmative action.  
As Morton points out, “[u]nder any redistributive scheme, some group 
will undoubtedly claim ‘innocent victim’ status.”72  Class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action merely shifts those harms to the 
wealthy, and thereby trades the racial hostility that allegedly results from 
race-based affirmative action programs for class-based hostility.73 And 
since race and ethnicity closely correlates with class and socioeconomic 
status, racial hostility and class-based hostility often go hand in hand.74 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I do not write this Essay as an indictment of class-based, 
socioeconomic affirmative action.  I am all for expanding opportunities 
for education and social mobility.  But there are serious constitutional 
and practical problems with class-based, socioeconomic affirmative 
action that are often ignored by its proponents. Until those issues are 
seriously addressed, I will continue to doubt the sincerity of those that 
advocate for its use and will not view class-based, socioeconomic 
affirmative action as a truly “workable” constitutional alternative to race-
based affirmative action.  Poverty certainly matters, but so does race.  
The intersection between the two makes it all the more important that we 
find an appropriate balance that accounts for both. 
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